The Case against Reincarnation

This book brings together a compendium of arguments against reincarnation as a hypothesis or doctrine. The author takes a spiritualist view that we survive physical death, but contends that this form of immortality is logically incompatible with reincarnation. He quotes a variety of interesting sources and correspondence with various friends and colleagues, including Arthur Oram, whom some members may remember. I have been familiar for some time that Swedenborg explained apparent cases of reincarnation in his day as a form of possession, an argument also considered by Ian Stevenson in his research. The main question at issue is that of identity, and perhaps one has to take a both/and approach rather than an either-or. Is it possible for Jenny Cockell to be fully herself and to have been the Irishwoman she remembers in her book? The author does not think so. He also has to explain Stevenson's cases as a form of temporary possession, a hypothesis which Stevenson does consider, but does not for him have the same explanatory value as reincarnation, given the further correspondence between memories and birthmarks. There is a good piece by Stephen Clarke summarising the arguments against reincarnation, but they bring the reader right back to the identity question. We may never know the answer for sure.