THE ANCIENT ORIGINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Ancient Origins fills a "gap" but not philosopher Joseph Levine's still-intractable, mysterious gap "between the physical properties of the brain…and the subjective experiences that the brain thereby creates" (also referred to as the "hard problem" of consciousness). Personally I question, but cannot convincingly refute, the assumption that the physical brain creates consciousness, rather than, say, channeling, receiving or embodying all manner of non-sensory, sensory as well as supersensory "information." No matter! Most SMN readers will also be familiar with another problem: the vague and variable definitions of consciousness, which most researchers feely admit is ever-elusive. Feinberg, a professor of psychiatry and neurology and Mallat, a professor of biology and medical sciences at least tell us that this book is not about "higher" reflective "self-consciousness" but rather aims to explore "sensory" or "primary consciousness," or more elaborately "neuroontologically subjective features of consciousness" (NSFC) comprising qualia, referral, mental unity, (isometric unity), and mental causation. They propose to trace the origin of the hard problem back to the origin of sensory consciousness in order to resolve "the neurobiological gap between subjective experience and the brain" with a theory of "neurobiological naturalism" derived, with some modification, from Searle's "biological naturalism." [At the risk of simplification this is the brain-centric view that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of brain activity. I also see a problem in assuming, or assuming to understand, subjectivity in remote-from-human-experience, and sometimes-extinct species of fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds mammals etc., For example the sensory faculties of such sentient creatures may not produce mental images that are experienced subjectively. We humans can sleep walk, or dream, or even drive a few miles, while responding to sensory input, but not be "consciously" aware of any subjective experience!]

Chapters 2 through 6 launch into what is essentially a biological and paleontological text dealing with the physical (morphological) evolution of the nervous system (brain), with particular emphasis on origins at the time of the popular and much-debated Cambrian explosion some 520 million years ago. At this time small animals developed nervous systems, eyes and mobility, all integrated and complimentary faculties described as "extreme sensory and cognitive enhancement." [Again, one asks, does "cognitive" follow from sensory?] The details of these developments are copiously and conscientiously illustrated, and tied to various interpretations of their significance, including, I am glad, to say a "holistic" appreciation that senses interact to create a unity of perception of the type referred to as mental unity or isomorphism: (e.g., you have two eyes, but experience one visual image, and your two ears hear one sound). Evidence for the development of sensory organs is well-known from the Cambrian, and later, fossil records, beginning when the first inch-long, proto-fish, with eyes and head, began to look like a vertebrate. So it seems, Feinberg and Mallat consider them as possible "candidates for the first conscious organisms on earth" but admit that other researchers consider that conscious species arose later with birds and mammals.

Again, without refuting their thesis, I am a little vague on the meaning of "conscious." Presumably this refers to previously-mentioned sensory or primary consciousness. Thus, as I understand it neuronal complexity can be considered a potential "marker" (their word) for consciousness, and so equated with said complexity. So again, the thesis is that the brain creates and evolves consciousness, and that brain size is a proxy for measuring consciousness. [What then do we make of cultures, and childhood development stages, that do not see the brain, or brain alone, as the seat of consciousness? It seems, in our desire to understand this "problem," we cannot escape the assumption that consciousness has an "origin," source or "seat."]

I admit to being bewildered by the equating of "conscious" with "consciousness" and diverse states and faculties (perception, recognition, memory and arousal) assumed or considered for animals as diverse as invertebrates, fish and mammals. Are conscious origins the same as origins of consciousness (or even knowable)? Few workers agree: some claim consciousness originated with fish (560-520 million years ago) others say it arose with mammals (220 my) and or birds (165 my) and the cerebral cortex, allowing the term cerebral consciousness, and such bewilderingly anthropomorphic concepts as "high computational needs of advancing consciousness" used in association with rather stale Darwinian "race for survival" terminology. [Methinks they protest too much on behalf of consciousness].

Chapter 7 on "sentience" defines "affect as a conscious experience" and launches into a list of workers who again trace said "origin of affective consciousness" as far back as fish (560 my) or merely back to the origin of H. sapiens (200,000 y). Although claiming "not to overwhelm the reader with detail," I was overwhelmed to the point of being underwhelmed (4 tables in Chapter 8 take up 10 pages). Mea culpa. Perhaps a failing on my part, but I find more and more data makes less and less sense.

I'm all for crediting invertebrates, fish, amphibians etcetera with remarkable sensory faculties which look to us like signs of impressive intelligence (some might use the ill-defined term "instinct"). But to categorise the perceptions of myriad non-human species on a scale of consciousness, affect, experience or sentience, (complexly and inconsistently defined and understood by different researchers), seems a tall order. Having said that it is interesting to ponder the extent to which this volume parallels our changing awareness, dare I say consciousness, of animals. As we humans have become "civilised," our relationship with animals has changed (see review of Troublesome Inheritance), and we speak in human-centric language of the "humane" treatment of animals. The animal rights movement (Network 119), and our concern for the ecological environment are just two manifestations of our shift in consciousness.

In this regard Jonathan Balcombe's new book What a Fish Knows is an interesting exposition on fish sentience, perception or "knowledge" dealing, among other things, with the essentially moral question of whether they feel pain, for example by demonstrating nociception (response to noxious stimulus). Feinberg and Mallet deal with this topic in some detail noting that "the question of fish pain is heavily debated." The point is that even if one is skeptical about categorising fish consciousness it is useful to have studies that trace the evolution of the nervous system back for a half billion years, if only because such expositions demonstrate our broader interest in the evolution of animal sentience, which in turn reflects our changing relationship with the animal kingdom. If, as some like to say, humans are the/a self-conscious organ of the biosphere, rather than a "separate" self-conscious, or exceptional species, then knowing ourselves, as far as it is possible, biologically and psychologically, involves knowing and delving into the biosphere at the psychic level of "knowing" and consciousness. I will let readers decide what "knowledge" about consciousness and experience arises from Ancient Origins, and only add that the exploration itself is evidence of the former we-are-part-of-the-biosphere view.