Science and the Good

Subtitled 'the tragic quest for the foundations of morality', this is an important book on a significant question: can science demonstrate what morality is and how we should live? The book's answer drawing on historical and contemporary research is no. The driving assumption behind modern research depends on the success of science in other areas, but knowledge of neural mechanisms or evolutionary advantages does not tell us how to live. The authors discuss key figures such as E.O. Wilson, Patricia Churchland, Sam Harris, Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene, each of which has their own take on the relationship between science and morality. A general flaw correctly identified by the authors is the proclivity to overreach, for instance in the work of Paul Zak who claims to show that oxytocin is the mechanism at the heart of the moral guidance system. The authors also clarify the necessary background in terms of definitions, for instance distinguishing between the prescriptive, descriptive and prudential definitions of morality. Then they criticise Michael Schermer for his albeit sophisticated circular approach where he 'must assume at the beginning the values he claims can be demonstrated scientifically' (p. 155). There is also the deeper issue that moral disagreements do not depend on issues that can be resolved empirically.

In their discussion of a turn towards disenchanted naturalism, the authors contrast attitudes on such essential topics as life, intentionality and consciousness where the disenchanted view leads inexorably to the conclusion that consciousness is an illusion and that we have no free will. More seriously, moral scepticism leads logically to moral nihilism, leaving no room 'for the genuinely prescriptive, for real value or obligation: 'this goes beyond the belief that moral truth cannot be known, to the belief that there is no genuine morality. The former is moral scepticism, the latter is moral nihilism.' (italics in original) Technically, physicalism leads to nihilism, a conclusion already drawn by Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov. One is left with science embracing a utilitarianism enabling us to achieve practical goals as a social engineering project underpinned by instrumental reasoning and a blurring of the distinction between persons and things. Moreover, it is important to remember that we are invariably embedded in history and culture as well as evolution when it comes to values. In concluding, the authors question the the validity of researching a universal foundation for moral discourse, preferring instead the quest for a shared understanding through our differences. This may not be so grand, but at least it is more realistic.