Science and Religion – an Impossible Dialogue

As the subtitle suggests, this book questions the fashionable emphasis on dialogue between science and religion by arguing that they are social institutions giving rise to incompatible ways of knowing and rooted in different methodologies and forms of knowledge. It is both a historical and sociological study going back to Copernicus and Galileo and building on the work of Durkheim on the growing autonomy of science. The author's fundamental position is that the methodological naturalism of science excludes any entity transcending nature given that 'all sciences must explain the world by natural principles, immanent to nature.' (p. 165) So there can be no supernatural causes, and the world has been justly disenchanted by the autonomisation of natural science - God has moved from the centre to the periphery. The perspective of institutions is indeed important, as they constitute shifting power relationships, and the author is certainly correct in his analysis that the Church still hangs onto epistemological and ontological power and authority, diminishing though it is. Science, however, also uses its corresponding power to exclude unorthodox and heretical views.

An important issue concerns the limits of science, which the author sees as the limits of our current horizon. He seems to share the view of Peter Atkins in the limitless power of science to explain everything in natural terms, including consciousness. The author traces the recent emergence of a new phase of science – religion dialogue, much of which has been supported by the John Templeton Foundation; this is critically discussed at length (p. 153 ff.) in terms of both prizes and programmes. Readers should note that American views on evolution are not reproduced in Europe. Many well-known books and thinkers are reviewed in the chapter on 'dialogue' between science and religion, along with the political implications of the Templeton Prize, for instance in the case of Martin Rees. The final chapter pits belief versus science, and in his conclusion - betting on reason - he does admit that methodological naturalism as the basis of science cannot itself be demonstrated even if he regards it as a good bet. He sees this as validated by the consequences and results it produces, although reason need not be confined to naturalistic premises when it can in fact operate on a wider philosophical basis than argued here.