Reductionism and the Development of Knowledge

A technical work that will interest philosophers of science, especially those concerned with how different forms of knowledge are constructed and how they relate to each other. The first chapter builds on Piaget's 'circle of the sciences' in terms of maths and logic, physics and chemistry, biology, psychology and sociology, while the second considers in more detail the relationship between understanding, reductionism and explanation. Here Willis Overton shows how the splitting of Descartes leads to claims of foundationalism, that is arguments in favour of the primacy of mind or matter respectively so that one is explained in terms of the other. This in turn corresponds to a distinction between description and explanation that allows a third step to insist that we can actually arrive at interpretation-free hypotheses, theories and laws! This view is overtaken by the insight that all data are theory-laden or that theories are underdetermined by evidence, which leads to a much more sophisticated picture. Further essays consider various aspects of understanding and representation within a broad consideration of Piaget's legacy.