POWER DOWN

Richard Heinberg's previous book The Party's Over, subtitled 'Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies' addressed the multi-faceted consequences of oil depletion, expressing his basic thesis in a series of succinct bullet points: Modern industrial societies are utterly dependent on fossil fuel energy resources, and known alternatives cannot provide an adequate substitution These societies are vulnerable to economic and political disruption as a result of even minor reductions in energy availability Fossil fuel depletion is inevitable Production will peak soon and global demand will outstrip global supply within ten years at most Oil will play an even more critical role in the geopolitics of the 21st century Only a co-operative response to oil depletion will minimise the short-term inconvenience in our transition to lower overall energy use. His fourth point now looks optimistic in the light of more recent figures as it is possible that demand will outstrip available supply before the end of 2005.

We are now in the process of applying a final strategy of drawing down nature's stocks of non-renewable energy resources. These, however, are subject to diminishing economic returns since the energy required for their extraction gradually increases to the point where more energy is required to extract them than is produced – this is known as the EROEI (energy return over energy invested – when this is less than one, the enterprise is wholly uneconomic). In this new book he eloquently analyses the options open to us as we grapple with the social, political and economic implications of Peak Oil. It is a sanguine account whose conclusions, although open, do not make encouraging reading. The first chapter recaps and updates the thesis of the earlier book in the light of six key factors: resource depletion, continued population growth, declining per capita food production, environmental degradation, unsustainable US debt and international political instability. As he points out, these factors are related to one another in complex and often mutually reinforcing ways. Does this mean that Western civilisation, like the Roman and Mayan before it, is headed for sudden or protracted collapse? Not necessarily. Heinberg discusses four possible scenarios: last one standing (war and competition), powerdown (self-limitation, co-operation and sharing), the magic elixir (wishful thinking and denial) and building lifeboats (community solidarity). Sadly he is correct that the first is the default scenario, and one that underlies the current Machiavellian US foreign policy, which is arguably on an eventual collision course with China – both are highly dependent on Middle East oil. This is the 'business-as-usual' path that will inevitably ensure catastrophic collapse since it is inherently unsustainable in every way – economically, ecologically and socially. Exit strategies from the current predicament can be classified as either 'supply-side' or 'demand-side'. The former include moving elsewhere, more intense exploitation or discovery of new exploitable resources. Unfortunately the supply-side remedies are temporary and arguably counterproductive so that demand-side solutions may supervene in terms of limiting population and/or resource usage, or, more drastically, die-off. The default option of power politics and resource wars has taken a new twist in the last few months with the debacle in Iraq and its putative connection with the London bombings. The strategic thinking that led to the invasion of Iraq has created a vicious (and to many predictable) terrorist backlash that has increased the instability of the very region that supplies the lion's share of oil. In addition, China is now taking up positions to ensure its own oil supplies (Saddam was supplying them before the invasion). So a new cold war between the US and China looms, with China in much stronger economic position than the US. The second option (powerdown) is unlikely to be chosen voluntarily by the international community. However, Heinberg does give practical examples of powerdown with Cuba's enforced reconfiguration of its agriculture following the withdrawal of Soviet subsidies. A smoother transition to a decentralised system is technically possible, but highly improbable in practice. The next section considers energy sources that the author thinks are flawed by wishful thinking: unconventional hydrocarbon sources like tar sands and methane hydrate, and hydrogen. He does not think these sources will prove economically viable; in addition, he points out that we are anticipating perpetual growth within a finite system, itself a flawed projection. His conclusion, persuasive in my view, is that we need to restrict per-capita resource consumption and reduce population. The last option includes a discussion of how societies collapse: population growth and resource consumption outstrip available supply and the result is a drastic decline in population – Malthus finally catches up with us. Previous collapses in the Mayan culture and Rome resulted in 90% population collapse. The pattern is a familiar one: 'in every instance, intensification of food production sparked population growth and vice-versa, while both led to depletion of soil and other resources.' An expansion of short-term carrying capacity tends to undercut long-term sustainability. Some readers will at this point advocate consciousness change. However, Heinberg asserts that the powerdown choice is consciousness change, and this means choosing to act rather than wait. However, the radical 'Movement' has virtually no political clout and no credible solution to the central issues of resource depletion and population pressure. Perhaps, as he says, local 'lifeboat communities' are the only practical solution other than waiting for some magical elixir. This is not a comforting book but one that makes the reader confront our looming predicament. If you want to think these issues through, there is no better place to begin.