OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE

From the author of 'The End of History' comes a book on the prospective end of humanity as we know it as he peers into the future consequences of the biotechnology revolution. He begins with the two best known 'dystopias' of the last century from Orwell and Huxley, arguing that Huxley's vision is the worrying one so far as the future of biotechnology is concerned. However, there is more than biotechnology at stake since other sciences with political implications are also proceeding apace. He looks at brain sciences and inheritance, commenting on the 'gene vs. nurture' debate and teasing out the contrasting reactions of Left and Right to research developments. This brings him to one of the central issues of the book, namely that the existence of a genetic factor in itself suggests 'a limitation of moral agency and human potentiality'. In addition, 'scientific knowledge about causation will inevitably lead to a technological search for ways to manipulate that causality'; and, he might have added, to make money out of it.

This limitation of moral agency in pursued in the next chapter on neuropharmacology, which Fukuyama rightly asserts is a harbinger of potential changes to come from genetic engineering. He spends time discussing the social and moral ramifications of Prozac and Ritalin, discerning three powerful political trends that he thinks will reappear in genetic engineering: the desire to medicalise behaviour and thence reduce responsibility for actions; the pressure of powerful economic interests; and the tendency to expand the therapeutic realm to cover an ever larger number of conditions. The first and third trends are reinforced by deterministic models inherent in the reductionist approach to science. The second trend is abetted by the vast quantity of junk food consumed, a factor that goes unnoticed in Fukuyama's analysis.

In his next chapter Fukuyama addresses some of the issues raised by increased longevity in terms of the relationship between the generations, highlighting the tension between length and quality of life. He is right to say that the dilemma of GE is how to balance benefits with potential harm but in some places it seems as if he has bought the biotech hype wholesale without carefully examining their projected claims. In any event, selective breeding or 'enhancement' of humans is on the table and has to be addressed. Fukuyama examines various lines of objection as an introduction to the second part, where he writes about human rights, human nature and human dignity. Here he takes a historical view that sheds light on our current situation and leads into his third part about what we should actually do.

The context is a polarisation between a libertarian, free-market, deregulation group that includes most researchers and the industry; and a more heterogeneous group with moral concerns about biotechnology. There is in fact a third, and here unrepresented, group, namely informed scientists who are opposed to these developments. Fukuyama does mention the limitations of reductionism when applied to complex wholes but neither Mae-Wan Ho nor Moyra Bremner feature in his bibliography. They argue that there are inherent flaws in the science as well as unpredictable factors (the law of unintended consequences does get a mention) that point towards the necessity of a precautionary approach,

Interestingly, the EU has broadly adopted a precautionary approach, which was eschewed by the Reagan administration in the 1980s when the industry view that there was no real break in continuity prevailed. The status of horizontal gene transfer remains one of the central issues today. Fukuyama argues against both a laisser faire attitude and against internal scientific and industry regulation on the grounds that the ends of science are matters for philosophy and politics, even if the means and research methods belong to the scientists themselves. I think he is right here, but will even global regulation work if there are culturally differing aspirations from which the biotechnology companies to move to the least regulated environment. And will the distinction between therapy and enhancement continue to hold? Nor can decisions be left to individual choice, which favours the rich and blurs the distinction between individual preference and moral choice. This freedom is trumped by the more important freedom of communities to protect their values. But will we collectively exercise this or will we be paralysed by our inability to draw the necessary moral distinctions which will give commercial companies free rein? And which countries will stand up and say that they don't want the inward investment and jobs and are happy to give them away to a competitor? Here there is a case for global co-ordination on the research as well as the political front.