Global Civil Society?

The starting point of the International Futures Forum of which I am a member is that we live in a complex and uncertain world that we can neither fully comprehend nor control. No issue makes this clearer than the globalisation process, which is defined in the first of these books as 'a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant'. Although these three books deal with the same underlying processes, they come from very different – and in some respects complementary – angles. The first book is written by an American professor of politics and government and forms part of the excellent OUP series of 'very short introductions'. The author of the second book is an Australian who is the founder of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of Westminster and takes a historical view going back into the 19th century. The third is more oriented towards activism and social change at the same time as being very critical of the current system of what the authors call 'Global Monetocracy'.

It is useful to see the historical development of globalisation described in terms of transport, population movements, trade and empire in order to understand the current and accelerated phase in which we find ourselves. John Keane traces the evolution of voluntary societies and international congresses in the period 1850-1914 and their crucial role in pushing social reforms through government. The first peace conference took place in the Hague in 1899, and the Union of International Associations dates from 1910. These developments suffered a severe setback after the First World War, as did the cause of democracy itself. However, the period since 1970 has seen an explosive growth of international NGOs to the current number of 50,000, with an estimated 5,000 congresses a year. Moreover, these organisations are now responsible for disbursing most of the government aid funds. This is a vital element of what Keane calls Global Civil Society.

Steger divides his treatment into the economic, political, cultural, social and ideological aspects of globalisation. For many people, the economic process is the primary one, and Steger gives an account of the neoliberal ideology that drives it along with the main institutions that prop it up, namely the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. For Madron and Joplin, these are the engines of the Global Monetocracy, which they also analyse in detail. Their most important points are that debt-driven economic growth is endemic in this system, and that it is entirely inconsistent with long-term stability, sustainability and social justice. I will return to this point below. Keane defines the features of what he calls 'turbocapitalism', which is driving us towards so-called free markets with a minimum of regulation, aided by the enormous flows of volatile capital that can practically bankrupt whole countries and force them into World Bank dictated Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). This encourages them to grow more crops of export, but the increased quantities merely serve to drive down the price in favour of the rich importers rather than the poor exporters. A further point is the significance of reserve currencies, especially the US dollar: banks accumulated them at the rate of $100bn a year between 1992 and 2000, which amounts to an interest free loan of $800bn from the rest of the world to the US. Moreover, most of these dollars were created as debt by US banks, generating a return calculated at $425bn a year!

When considering the ideological dimension of globalisation, Steger critically examines five claims: Globalisation is about the liberalisation and global integration of markets – but this is only achievable through the political project of engineering free markets, i.e. interference by state power; Globalisation (in this sense) is inevitable and irreversible – this is another way of conveying the principles of neoliberalism; Nobody is in charge of globalisation – but it serves the interests of the North 'while securing the power of affiliated elites in the global South'. Globalisation benefits everyone – in fact it leads to increasing concentrations of power and wealth as well as growing inequality; Globalisation furthers the spread of democracy – but this means little more than voting, and certainly not the kind of widespread involvement and participation advocated in the Gaian Democracies model. In this and other ways, Steger's book provides a useful critical introduction to the key issues.

Keane's book is also polemical in its thrust, but pays more attention to the political aspects and regards Global Civil Society as an emerging but essentially incomplete project. Thus it can also serve as a normative model towards which we can move, with an emphasis on non-violence, pluralism, self-organisation, individuality, equality, mutual assistance, self-reflexiveness and responsibility. The current system is likened to a 'cosmocracy', defined as 'a conglomeration of interlocking and overlapping sub-state, state and suprastate institutions and multi-dimensional processes that interact, and have political and social effects, on a global scale'. (p. 98) Although many of these institutions and processes are legalised, they collectively lead to 'clumsy government' and fall short in a number of respects: political entropy, accountability, and the existence of a dominant power in the form of the US.

The power issue links directly into political and economic systems, notably through arms expenditure and exports – US exports in 2000 amounted to $18.6bn, about half of the total, while 2004 US military expenditure will exceed $400bn. Keane's discussion of these issues would have been enhanced by considering the links with the Project for a New American Century, which was the driving ideological force behind the invasion of Iraq and the philosophy of US hyperpower and 'full spectrum dominance'. He does, however, examine structures and types of violence – nuclear, civil war and terrorism – wondering if a non-violent global civil society can come about without the use of force. He pins his hopes on Global Civil Society as the only ethical ideal 'capable of recognising and respecting a genuine plurality of social differences'.

None of this is enough for Madron and Joplin, who take a far more radical approach based on systems theory. Gaian Democracies is the most important book of the three. In my view, no analysis that does not start from systems theory is worth considering, although to this one needs to add an understanding of collective psychological dynamics, which is absent from all three books. The authors succinctly outline the new language of change, which provides a refresher for those familiar to these ideas and a primer for the unfamiliar. The two most important concepts (the first was new to me) are Horst Rittel's distinction between 'wicked' and 'tame' problems and the notion of soft systems methodologies. A 'wicked' problem ('wild' might have been better) is one that arises from the complexities of non-linear systems, while a tame problem stems from the faults of a linear system, which are easier to fix, and can be addressed from inside the system. This is not true for wicked problems, which require a whole-system shift. The trouble is that our key problems are of the wicked kind, to which governments are trying to apply inappropriate tame solutions.

Madton and Jopling show how humanity is currently caught in a vicious spiral brought about by engineered hard systems thinking, which many still consider the only way forward – look at the increasingly desperate attempts to impose order and control. The truth is that 'natural [cyclical)]systems cannot be controlled with [linear] hard systems thinking'. The next chapter contains a brilliant analysis of the dynamics or emergent properties of the Global Monetocracy, showing its various self-perpetuating, meshing components and demonstrating its inherent unsustainability. This all produces a political vacuum, in which some are driven to adopt what the authors call 'defence' rather than 'change' strategies. Furthermore, the NGOs of civil society have no real political mandate, which limits their long-term effectiveness.

The heart of the book is the notion of Gaian Democracies, which is a new interlocking paradigm of components, which are also spelt out. The key question is whether we can reconfigure our democratic systems before Gaia launches her own systems shift! One of the keys is real active participation, which is presumably the reason why the authors do not elucidate the necessary purposes and principles. Many of the dialogue processes explained draw on the work of the Brazilian Paulo Freire, but they could also have looked at the dialogue work by David Bohm and the action research of John Heron and his colleagues. These processes require 'liberated leaders' to energise them, and the authors do give a variety of practical illustrations of Gaian Democracies in action.

Naturally, the key question is turning theory into practice using a sufficient scale of people power and participation. We need changes in our thinking as well as the inspiration of radical thinkers and activists. But most of all we need widespread personal commitment and action in order to move in this direction. As the World Social Forum, says 'another world is possible', but only if there is sufficient mobilisation of energy. Is there a middle way here? Not if you accept the systems thesis, although structures and institutions can be reconfigured within a new system based on different purposes and principles. If you would like to get involved, see www.wwdemocracy.org and www.gaiandemocracies.net