GETTING DARWIN WRONG

Although evolutionary psychology (EP) was only 'announced to the world' as a discipline in 1992, this 'extremely modern science' (if it can be called a science) has many precursors, going back to Plato. In Getting Darwin Wrong psychologist Brendan Wallace does a thorough job of showing the many influences leading to the discipline. He also shows the weaknesses of a field based on the assumptions of its proponents rather than any new 'discoveries.' Contrary to popular opinion, EP is not the adaptation of Darwinism to psychology. Rather it is the adaptation of cognitivism ('information processing' and 'computational' theories) to the field of evolution. In short, its proponents believe the mind/brain functions in a modular way like a digital computer or Turing Machine, which 'in theory' mimics the cognitive abilities of humans. If wrong, as Wallace claims, EP 'could not be true and its relation to Darwinism is irrelevant' (original emphasis). For similar reason (EPers are not biologists) EP does not derive from the largely discredited field of Sociobiology (which looks for matches between modern behaviour and evolution that supposedly maximise 'fitness'). Instead EP claims the mind is adapted (hard-wired) to the environment we lived in back in the Ice age. Thus EP, like cognitivism, believes in fixed, internal cognitive states or structures that differ from the more fluid and plastic modes that allow the more flexible adaptive responses to the environment proposed by behaviourist (and sociobiologists), with which the EP crowd disagree on principle. [I take this to mean, rather surprisingly, that EP sees little historical evidence for human cognitive advance since Palaeolithic times. While one might feel this way when dealing with some rather disagreeable individuals!, the cultural evidence suggests otherwise]. Steven Pinker (Harvard) is most often cited (and admonished) as the spokesman for EP. His rather entrenched cognitivist position is that the mind operates reductionistically, using modular 'pre-installed mental apparatus,' rather than as a flexible, holistic, general-purpose organ more suitable to probabilistic (statistical/stochastic) analysis. Wallace repeats this often, but allows there that may be at least one specific modular algorithm in the brain/mind that works. This is Chomsky's Language Acquisition Device (LAD) which Wallace considers the most convincing example yet proposed on the basis of actual analysis. The LAD suggests that a Universal Grammar seems to operate independent of nurture and environment. Such notions helped promote a 'cognitive revolution' in the 1960s, further fuelled by interest in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Information Processing Theory. However, looking into the historical influences affecting cognitivism and EP (which Wallace does with great thoroughness) we can trace back the notion that the mind operates according to intrinsic rules to 17th century rationalism (Descartes) and ultimately to Plato and mathematical ideals. Thus, notions of natural and mathematical law are, at least to some extent, a holdover from Platonic metaphysics and Pythagorean mathematical mysticism. Cognitivism and EP essentially represent a new type of phrenology (!) in which each bit of the brain/mind has a pre-determined function. This tradition is also responsible for the perennial problem of subject-object and qualitative-quantitative dualism which has deeply affected modern scientific thinking. [I suggest we also consider the rise of robust self-consciousness in this regard]. Cognitivist/EP theories raise the problematic specter of the Homunculus, the little man 'in the head,' who makes sure algorithm rules are obeyed. Unfortunately the Homunculus needs its own little Homunculus to make programs run smoothly and so on down the path of infinite regress. Philosophers may think the Homunculus silly, but 's/he' plays a big role in computer programming where subroutines take on the role of algorithm 'monitors' and 'supervisors.' The main EP flaw seems to be that it simply assumes, without evidence, that the brain/mind operates like a digital computer. Although this allows EP to brand its opponents as anti-science and anti-evolution Wallace and others see through the ruse. Alternative approaches such as 'Ecological Psychology' tell us 'we don't have to 'internally represent' the world [to ourselves] because we already have a representation… in front of our noses. It is called…the world.' We react directly to the world, and not through algorithm processing subroutines in the mind. Why does EP hold that we (our brains) operate on pre-installed programmes rather than by evolutionary-flexible adaptation to our complex changing world? And why does EP still reject more general purpose learning models, preferring those that espouse rigid modular programmes purportedly evolved in the Ice Age and earlier? By the end of the book Wallace convinces us that EP has got Darwin and Darwinism seriously wrong in its 'reactionary attempt to patch up 20th century Cognivitist orthodoxy.' Many trends in contemporary psychology, especially those dealing with 'enactivism,' and the embodied mind, show the brain to be far more flexible than the EP paradigm allows. (See Network 103, for review of Alva Noë's new book). EP is, or has already crumbled, along with AI and the high hopes invested in it. Replacing EP and cognitivism are ideas about 'distributed' cognition (enactivism and the embodied mind) and 'Activity Theory,' which holds that we learn language (inner monologue) from exposure to external social dialog. Likewise 'Situated Cognition' shows how much we are influenced by the milieu of our environments: thus the pendulum swings back towards behaviourism. Wallace pulls no punches in his final conclusion that 'cognitivist orthodoxy' must be 'overthrown' in order to relegate EP to 'a footnote' in the history of psychology, and so make way for a 'genuine Evolutionary Psychology.' [Personally I have always had considerable doubts about the EP message, and so share Wallace's similar misgivings]. One strength of the book is that it reviews the rise and fall of EP in a very helpful and cogent historical context, giving useful background on how other 20th century disciplines have given psychologists, philosophers and evolutionary theorists food for thought. Wallace's expositions are in places rather dense, but mostly this reflects his need to 'explain' the intricacies of other convoluted theories, some of which are presented with the help of extensive quotations. In such cases, he unpacks the verbiage in some detail, and often repeats and summarises his expositions to drive important points home. His expositions are nothing if not thorough. My only quibble is that the book contains a rather surprising number of unnecessary typographical errors. In conclusion, it seems that what Daniel Dennett called Darwin's Dangerous Idea has resulted in a number of dangerous (i.e., wrong) spin offs, which make little or no evolutionary sense. As we know from Piaget and others cognition develops or 'evolves' during ontogeny, just as mind/consciousness has evidently evolved during the evolution of our species (Homo sapiens) and our ancestors. Thus, as Wallace says, there is room for a genuine Evolutionary Psychology, or evolutionary Theory of Mind. The problem seems to be that no one has yet formulated one that the mainstream of psychology finds convincing. Until then psychologists are likely to continue misunderstanding and misapplying evolutionary principles.