Artificial You

Susan Schneider holds a chair at the Library of Congress and is the director of the AI, Mind and Society Group at the University of Connecticut. This is a brilliantly incisive commentary on the central philosophical issues arising out of AI developments. Interspersed in the text are possible future scenarios offering options for 'mind design' used as a starting point for further analysis. At the outset, the author admits finding the prospect of mind design humbling 'because frankly, we are not terribly evolved' - only too true! There is a gap between our technological and social development, identified by the likes of Aldous Huxley, E.F. Schumacher and Arnold Toynbee decades ago. Moreover, there are not only known unknowns ahead, but also unknown unknowns. All this calls for what she calls metaphysical humility. Given that 'consciousness is the philosophical cornerstone of our moral systems', the whole question of machine consciousness is key, not only in itself but also in terms of value.

We are all inclined to get caught up in our metaphors, confusing map with territory, and here we have the language of hardware and software, with the brain running the mind as a software programme. The author dissects and demolishes this model, pointing out that the mind is not an abstraction like an equation – this is in fact a category error (p. 132). While Elon Musk and Ray Kurzweil enthuse about merging with AI, Schneider cautions these 'fusion-optimists' by pointing out the distinction between spatiotemporal continuity and continuity of identity, which brings up the whole definition of a person and, more generally, the various possible mind-body philosophical positions. AI enthusiasts adopt a computational understanding of thinking as information processing and can be characterised as 'patternists.' This form of psychological continuity is contrasted with brain-based materialism, the soul theory and the no-self view. For transhumanist patternists, it is theoretically possible on the basis of identical configurations to upload the mind into a computer to bypass physical ageing.

One problem that arises is reduplication - there could theoretically be various versions of you, each claiming to be the real one. And if your neurons have been totally replaced by artificial equivalents, are you really the same person? Missing from this whole discussion is any consideration of a spiritual or transcendental dimension of intelligence as indicated by mystical and cosmic experiences pointing towards a universal mind, although the author does maintain that science cannot in fact rule out the existence of the soul - see my review of Richard Swinburne above. The whole debate is also highly left-hemispheric and makes almost no mention of feelings and the heart – it is all clever analysis and rapid computation. The author speculates that other forms of intelligence might have evolved from 'biological' to synthetic, and many scientists regard this as the direction of evolution – enhancement rather than enlightenment. The clarity of the argument and the importance of the issues makes this book a must-read, advising as it does deep reflection and debate on who we are before rushing headlong into fusion technologies steeped in computer metaphors playing fast and loose with the attribution of consciousness.