The Ukraine War and the Eurasian World Order

In 1997, former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski published his hugely influential book called The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geopolitical Imperatives. This contributed to the emergence of the neo-conservative Project for New American Century (PNAC) of a foreign policy of liberal hegemony allied to American exceptionalism depicting the US as a force for good championing freedom and democracy against authoritarian regimes. Moreover, he pointed out the pivotal strategic nature of Ukraine in relation both to Western and Russian interests. These three books question the naïve and simplistic US national self-image, whose shadow is represented by covert operations conducted against scores of countries by the CIA on the basis of plausible deniability (the Republic has mutated into Empire). Over 20 years ago, I reviewed a book by Jim Garrison entitled America as Empire – Global Leader or Rogue Power? I will return to this below. David Ray Griffin's final book returns to the theme of two earlier books – Bush and Cheney – how they ruined America and the world; and The American Trajectory – Divine or Demonic.

As Richard Falk points out in his introduction to David's book, his extensive questioning of the official narrative on 9/11 made him persona non grata with the establishment for entering this no-go zone for public commentators, in spite of his evident intellectual courage and integrity, and his meticulous documenting of evidence. A series of chapters investigate US activity in foreign countries, including Latin America, the Middle East (See Kevork Almassian on Syria, where the CIA funded destabilising terrorist groups - https://substack.com/@kevorkalmassian - and most recently, Ukraine. David writes that 'Ukraine is Washington's "weapon of choice" for torpedoing Nord Stream and putting a wedge between Germany and Russia. . . . Washington needs to create the perception that Russia poses a security threat to Europe. That's the goal. They need to show that Putin is a bloodthirsty aggressor with a hair-trigger temper who cannot be trusted.'

This propaganda campaign demonising Vladimir Putin has been extremely successful with the public at large, and David notes that 'The U.S. information warfare capability is unparalleled: when it comes to manipulating perceptions, producing an alternate reality and weaponising minds, the U.S. has no rivals.' By far the longest chapter is devoted to the Ukrainian conflict, and David's analysis has much in common with that of Glenn Diesen in his magisterial study. This view is shared by other prominent commentators, notably John Mearsheimer (https://mearsheimer.substack.com/), Jeffrey Sachs (https://jeffdsachs.substack.com/) and Alfred de Zayas (https://www.counterpunch.org/author/alfred-de-zayas/), former UN independent expert on a just international order. The key point to understand is the one-sidedness in a historical context of the NATO propaganda that the war in Ukraine was 'unprovoked' and that Putin is an aggressive imperialist who has to be stopped in his tracks (I am not a supporter of Putin, but I do recognise the legitimacy of Russian security concerns that have been repeatedly ignored by the US and NATO). Jeffrey Sachs has in multiple articles, interviews and podcasts explained the history of the relationships between the US and Russia since the end of the Cold War – he was actually in the room when the end of the Soviet Union was declared. Mikhael Gorbachev sought to normalise relationships by launching his proposal to develop a "Common European Home," which envisioned demilitarising foreign affairs by dismantling both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Subsequent leaders were also anxious to build a common European security architecture, but this was replaced by NATO expansion.

However, despite assurances by then Secretary of State James Baker that NATO would not expand to the east, this process was initiated by the foreign policy establishment under the Clinton administration, to the dismay of many distinguished figures such as George Kennan, who publicly warned that this was a sure way of re-creating the Cold War. The military-industrial-intelligence complex had its way - a succession of leaders was demonised and assassinated, while the grinding War Machine continued to churn out fabulous wealth for shareholders and politicians. Already in 2008, the year in which Ukraine was promised NATO membership, President Putin warned of Russian red lines, and many senior figures recognised the legitimacy of his concerns at the time, including the UK ambassador Sir Roderick Lyne, future CIA Director Robert Gates, and then UN ambassador William Burns, also later Director of the CIA.

Burns wrote: 'Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin's sharpest liberal critics I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests. NATO would be seen as throwing down the strategic gauntlet. Today's Russia will respond' – which they did. Subsequent developments included CIA support for the 2014 coup in Ukraine (cumulatively to the tune of $5 billion), using the Minsk accords as a way of buying time to arm Ukraine, and refusing all Russian overtures on common security, while ultimately sabotaging the talks in Turkey in March 2022 in order to prolong the war. The strategic aim was and is to weaken Russia.

Cynically, as admitted by senior US senators, the human losses and infrastructure destruction affect Ukraine as it is used to wage a proxy war against Russia – 'fighting to the last Ukrainian.' As Diesen reports: 'Senator Mitt Romney also informed his countrymen that sending weapons to Ukraine was "the best national defence spending I think we've ever done" because it is a relatively small amount to pay and "we're losing no lives in Ukraine." In return for this investment "We're diminishing and devastating the Russian military for a very small amount of money… a weakened Russia is a good thing." Senator Richard Blumenthal reassured Americans that "we're getting our money's worth on our Ukraine investment" because "for less than 3 percent of our nation's military budget, we've enabled Ukraine to degrade Russia's military strength by half." Besides weakening Russia and sending a message to China, the U.S. was able to "restore faith and confidence in American leadership—moral and military. All without a single American service woman or man injured or lost." In fact, the current military situation does not reflect this optimistic view.

The wider picture discussed by Diesen is the nature of international order, and the inexorable trend towards a multipolar order where the US no longer exerts imperial control in the name of a so-called rules-based order, which it has no compunction in ignoring itself - as empires are inclined to do. In the 90s, it was envisaged that the US hegemonic order of liberal universalism would last throughout the 21st century (Pax Americana), but it is now declining before our eyes, also for internal reasons (liberal excesses and failure to address domestic problems) and the bankruptcy brought about by war expenditures in excess of $8 trillion since 2000.

As Diesen writes, every world order 'aspires and appears to be permanent. Preserving the status quo is conflated with stability, even though the world is constantly changing in terms of the international distribution of power, technologies, economic development, societal challenges, values, and ideals. It is the ability to manage change and reform that determines its stability, as the failure to adapt results in stagnation, decay, and collapse.' (my emphasis) We are now returning to a Westphalian balance of power, which also has to include legitimacy. Diesen notes (p. 5) that 'The proxy war in Ukraine revealed the fatal dysfunction of the hegemonic world order that has accelerated the transition to a multipolar world order. While the Westphalian world order seeks a balance of power to avoid conflicts, the unipolar order necessitates perpetual conflicts to ensure allies are dependent and rivals are weakened.' (I should also mention the personal cost to Diesen of publicly articulating his views, including being branded as a Putin apologist and being systematically harassed by the Norwegian government – as is also the case in the US with Scott Ritter).

The current rhetoric regards diplomacy as appeasement, proposing only further military intervention. Diesen calls this idealistic diplomacy, which 'divides states into good and evil, into peace-loving and bellicose. It envisions a permanent peace by the punishment of the latter and the triumph of the former.' He further comments: 'If it is recognised that the world is divided by conflicting interests, then peace is created by placing ourselves in the shoes of the opponent and pursuing compromise. (my emphasis) However, if conflicts are defined by good versus bad values, then empathy and compromise become tantamount to appeasement and betrayal of sacred values that can ensure peace.' This is a recipe for continued deadlock.

Interestingly, Walter Lippmann famously wrote in 1965 (p. 80): 'A mature great power will make measured and limited use of its power. It will eschew the theory of a global and universal duty, which not only commits it to unending wars of intervention, but intoxicates its thinking with the illusion that it is a crusader for righteousness.' Moreover, in a famous lecture given to the American University in the year of his death, President Kennedy asked: 'What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war.' This is precisely the path followed since his perfidious assassination orchestrated by his own military and intelligence services. In the long run, diplomacy and mutual accommodation is the only way forward. In his conclusion, Diesen bleakly comments (p. 275): 'Rather than envisioning a transition to a balanced multipolar Westphalian world order, Blinken envisioned a struggle against both China and Russia under America's global leadership. If this continues to be the view of the West, we will witness a great tragedy for humankind.'

In his thoughtful contribution, Patrick Watts considers the history and future of the American Empire, with an interesting section on the end of various historical empires. He considers first internal threats – social decay from within, the corruption of politics by money and power, and the erosion of trust in institutions and media, which has become an arm of government communication – hence the rise of alternative media and the war against disinformation. Then he moves onto external threats in relation to war, international relations, and environmental threats. All this is very thoroughly covered, although I disagreed with his views on Russia and Ukraine, which seem to me largely informed by NATO propaganda without any consideration for the historical background explained above.

In his conclusions, Patrick explains why he defends the American empire as an alternative to authoritarian and intolerant regimes – but not in its current form.

The key question is whether America can evolve into a compassionate empire that serves to help all mankind – a leadership of collaboration not competition in accordance with its founding ideals, which would involve recapturing some moral high ground and articulating a vision of reimagined democracy, which eradicates the relationship between money and politics – easier said than done. He proposes the rebuilding of trust (this can only come above through transparency), and a positive, rather than a zero-sum, game guided by empathy rather than self-interest. For me, this would involve a profound recognition of our common humanity and interdependence as reflected in the principle of interconnectedness found in leading sciences. He concludes that 'The American people deserve better and must demand better.'

Interestingly, these conclusions echo those of Jim Garrison from 20 years ago when he asked if America could become the final Empire by refocusing from its war on terror towards pioneering network governance and deliberative democracy based on the common good, rather than systems of centralised control: 'If America would protect the world militarily while building cooperative structures, champion the free market while emphasising the common good, and use its national sovereignty to pioneer network democracy at a global level, it could be not only the greatest Empire of the world has ever known but also the final Empire. (p. 200) Sadly, cynical opportunism has prevailed over these visions, but the call remains to step up to more collaborative and cooperative international systems, to grow in maturity, and to ways of living together harmoniously on our beautiful planet. We the people demand this in the name of our common humanity.