Aham:I

This technical book sets out to explore the enigma of the sense of self in both Indian and Western traditions. Our experience of I-Consciousness is immediate and 'evidently indubitable, yet remains unfathomable.' It is, as the author points out, 'a phenomenon that simply cannot be formulated as a problem like any other phenomenon or subjected to a similar sort of objective critical examination' - as the whole field of consciousness studies is coming to realise after three centuries of successful scientific reductionism applied to other fields. It is apparent by the end of the book that there are so many facets, levels and angles of approach that final agreement about the nature of I-Consciousness has never been reached and almost certainly never will be. However, this does not make the study any less valuable, and for the western reader the focus on Indian philosophy is particularly useful in linguistic, epistemological and metaphysical terms.

The first chapter considers consciousness as epistemically primary, 'that by means of which we know all' as exemplified in the Upanishads. Next comes an analysis of facets of naturalism, represented in India by the Carvakas where selfhood is a natural phenomenon, as also maintained by physicalism, epiphenomenalism and reductionism favoured by modern philosophy and psychology. The self as substance is espoused by dualism but radically questioned by Buddhism and there are deep divisions about valid sources of knowledge and evidence. The Indian schools that advocate the idea of self as substance such as Vaisesika, are compared with the philosophies of Descartes and Locke. The Sankhya, on the other hand, maintains I-Consciousness to be composite and thereby making a conceptual distinction between ego and self, while projecting the idea of reality of many selves. The school of Advaita Vedanta also accepts the distinction between ego (ahamkara) and Self (atman) but denies the idea of plurality of selves. This school championed the idea of nonduality of consciousness, declaring that ultimately 'the self is the self of all' and thus 'exploring subjectivity to its ultimate limit' and linking this process with liberation, as one also finds in Western Gnostics. Then there are linguistic issues and differing layers of subjectivity as analysed by Hume, Searle and Anscombe. There is a special chapter on I and no-self theories in the Buddhist tradition, with comparisons to Parfit and Nozick.

A consideration of conceptual scenarios in cross-cultural context highlights Husserl's transcendental phenomenology compared with Advaita Vedanta as well as self-awareness in Buddhism and existentialism. There is a famous story about F.E. Smith interacting with a mediocre judge who, after receiving a further explanation said he was none the wiser, to which Smith retorted that at least he was better informed. Readers here will indeed be wiser as well as better informed by this complex and sophisticated discussion of the nature of I-Consciousness, to which there is no simple solution and many contending views on a problem that can neither be resolved nor dissolved by thought and analysis. This book is a bold cross-cultural endeavour to explore this ultimate question and as such repays close study.