THE SELF DOES NOT DIE – Second Edition

Subtitled ‘verified paranormal phenomena from near-death experiences’, this is one of the most important books to be published in the field, and directly challenges the conventional materialistic view that the brain generates consciousness – a largely unquestioned assumption taken for granted by mainstream neuroscience, psychology and philosophy. This position is what Oxford philosopher Robin Collingwood called an absolute presupposition in his seminal 1940 book An Essay on Metaphysics. The relationship between the brain and consciousness was discussed in detail by William James in his lecture on human immortality delivered at Harvard as far back as 1898 (it is available on the Internet). He distinguishes three logical possibilities: that the brain generates or produces consciousness; that it permits a range of consciousness; and it transmits rather than originates consciousness (these days, the permissive and transmissive views are variations on what is now called filter theory). James drew on the work of another little-known Oxford philosopher F.C.S. Schiller, who in 1891 had published anonymously Riddles of the Sphinx, calling himself a troglodyte – the cave dweller of Plato’s Republic. This is an absolutely brilliant book, which I was lucky enough to find in the second-hand bookshop. Henri Bergson – hugely influential in his lifetime but very neglected these days – took a similar view, arguing that the brain had to exclude and select from a vast range of stimuli.

As readers may well be aware – and we have lecture on this topic by Andreas Sommer in the autumn – James was a leading psychical researcher in his day, and pointed out that, while for normal research purposes the productive theory worked very well, it fails to account for psychic experience, which requires a wider theoretical approach; hence his second and third proposals. This is still true today, and is central to the arguments and evidence adduced in this book. The second edition contains 24 new cases, making a total of 128 carefully documented accounts where the perceptions of the experiencer are confirmed by third-party witnesses – often to their astonishment. As Harald Walach has noted, it would be impossible to refute this number of cases. My own approach to this issue as explained in Survival – Death as Transition – is that such unique cases need to be treated using legal rather than scientific criteria of proof beyond reasonable doubt. One thought experiment would be to ask the experiencer and the third-party witness, for instance a surgeon, to describe independently the sequence of events in question, then for the judge to assess whether the two accounts match sufficiently to draw the conclusion that they are talking about the same experience. This argument could be applied to all the cases in the book, which will have a cumulative effect on readers as they proceed. It will simply not do to dismiss all such cases as anecdotal.

The various chapters cover extrasensory veridical perception of the immediate environment, of events beyond the reach of the physical senses, during cardiac arrest, then after death communications with strangers and familiar people, reciprocal observations of OBEs and NDEs by others, miraculous healing, and paranormal abilities after NDEs. The analysis throughout is rigorous and detailed, from which the authors draw further more general conclusions. There is an important chapter on how sceptics attempt to explain away near-death experiences, focusing mainly on the Dutch sceptic – or rather pseudo-sceptic as the late Charley Tart would say - Dr Gerald Woerlee. The chapter begins with a detailed treatment of reactions to neuroscientist Dr Eben Alexander’s book describing his own experience, Proof of Heaven (an over-sensational title chosen by his publisher). Many such sceptics consider paranormal experiences impossible in principle, as highlighted by Jeff Kripal, who observes that such so-called ‘impossible’ experiences happen all the time – hence, as Alfred Russel Wallace pointed out 150 years ago, there are in fact no impossible facts, and if your theory fails to account for the facts, then it is the theory that needs modifying.

The argument of in principle impossibility is employed to ignore or dismiss any evidence that seems to contradict the materialist view. However, as Kripal points out, to dismiss is to miss. Underlying this conflict is the assumption of the primacy of matter, hence of the brain giving rise to consciousness. The thrust of the Galileo Commission Report is to invite such scientists to look through the telescope at the extensive evidence that points to the philosophical necessity of a change in world view. Eben was subjected to a barrage of uninformed criticism and even character assassination. However, as Bernardo Kastrup observes, Alexander ‘is most certainly well-qualified to understand what parts of the brain should correlate to what kind of experience. It is ludicrous to suggest otherwise. The bottom line is this: Alexander not only has the scientific credentials required to interpret his experience properly, he also has unique perspective of having had the experience himself’, something his critics did not, and indeed the experience completely inverted his prior conventional understanding of the relationship between brain and consciousness.

The authors devote over 30 pages to analysing and rebutting Woerlee’s arguments, pointing out that they are generically ad hoc, positing implausible and highly unlikely explanations to shore up the materialist approach. The language is often one of debunking and denial from a viewpoint informed by hard materialism and rational humanism. The irony is that such thinkers claim that they are upholding science and reason when their objections are narrowly closed-minded and blinkered while failing to address the specifics and implications of such cases as are cited here. The well-known dentures case highlighted by Pim van Lommel is subjected to analysis, also drawing on an interview with the witnessing nurse in question - largely dismissed by Woerlee - including the significance of the denture being removed before the heart massage machine was turned on. Another area of contention is whether the experience actually took place during the period of unconsciousness or could have been reconstructed while recovering. Again, the devil is in the detail, and it is just such details that need to be explained. Many sceptics are also emotionally invested in militant atheism, claiming that there are physiological or psychological explanations for the whole range of NDEs. Among others, Bruce Greyson has refuted such claims.

Sadly, the people who would most benefit from this book are least likely to read it due to the powerful influence of scientific materialism within the institutions, and the career perils of being branded as a heretic – all the more so in an age of increasing pressure to comply with orthodoxy. A challenge to one’s philosophy is taken as a threat to one’s identity, but the irony observed by the likes of Kenneth Ring and Rupert Sheldrake is that many scientists admit having a personal interest and even experience of paranormal phenomena, but are very reluctant – understandably lacking the courage – to ‘come out’. The transition to post-materialism would be accelerated if the bridge between private and public could be crossed, while both Rupert and Alex Gomez-Marin report that many younger scientists are interested in transpersonal experiences, partly through their own psychedelic journeys. The book is an absolute landmark and required reading for an expanded view of the science of consciousness.

In addition to the SMN Book Prize, the book has been recognised with an award from the Parapsychological Association - https://www.parapsych.org/articles/37/723/2025_pa_book_award_the_self_does.aspx