Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind

One might expect Sapiens: a brief history of humankind by historian Yuval Noah Harari (YNH) to cover less than philosopher Ken Wilber's "A Brief History of Everything" or Bill Bryson's "A Short History of Nearly Everything." Bryson and Wilber managed to write about 'everything' while hardly ever touching on the same subjects (Network 87)! Best seller Sapiens, by Oxford PhD and Hebrew University of Jerusalem lecturer has created quite a buzz, and has already been followed up by the sequel Homo Deus (reviewed below). The 'buzz,' at least for Sapiens, is in my opinion quite well deserved. YNH writes crisply and confidently. He has a knack for shining clear lights on the meaningful events, themes and turning points in our species journey to date, helping us learn or at least appreciate the so called 'lessons of history.'

His fluent style is simultaneously chatty, a little provocative and occasionally blunt. For example, while marching us through pre-sapiens prehistory (Neanderthals, cave art, cognitive revolutions and all that) he tosses out "it is doubtful whether Homo sapiens will be around a thousand years from now." Certainly given the dating of the cognitive, agricultural and scientific revolutions at about ~70,000, ~12,000 and 500 BP, the structure around which the book is built, we may well ask if we have any idea where this accelerating trajectory is leading us. YNH uses the term Sapiens for 'our' species H. sapiens and the term 'human' for all half dozen members of the genus Homo (more or less embracing species, including the earliest crude tool-users, back to ~3 million years BP). He credits 30,000-year-old H. sapiens with the same physical, emotional and intellectual abilities we have, a perhaps debatable claim when considering the consciousness structure paradigms and concomitant cultural institutions recognised by Gebser and Wilber. He also equates our ability to think and imagine with the notion that we create unreal 'fictions,' but one is left unclear as to whether he means that thoughts, ideas and cultural symbols are somehow unreal. After all civilisations rise, fall assimilate and re-invent themselves around ideologies and YNH happily observes and acknowledges such 'fiction' dynamics.

The agricultural revolution is described, ironically as a 'fraud' and a trap when wheat domesticated humans and not vice versa. It tied us down and forced us into longer hours of back-breaking labour, including weeding. However, it had advantages because settled villages, towns and eventually city states reaped the benefits of surplus and 'collective power' making security, cooperation and future planning important. Codes of law and justice appeared. Jump forward and we see the emergence of notions of humanism and equality on which YNH expounds with appropriate political correctness. And rightly so. His expositions on racial and gender equality are timely and adroitly woven in to historical contexts. The book, by the way, is well-illustrated in colour, and conveniently broken into chapters with many catchy subheadings. There is a marvelous illustration of Louis XIV with long curly hair, silk stockings, colourful embroidered cloak and high heels – the picture of "eighteenth century masculinity" – contrasted with President Obama in a drab navy blue suit, with nothing to distinguish him from a thousand other suits.

Midway through the book YNH summarises much of his exposition with the statement that religion, along with empire and money has been one of the 'three great unifiers of humankind.' Again YNH might have cited authors like Wilber and William Irwin Thompson who have noted the rise of 'collective power' from tribe to nation state to global 'empire,' alongside concomitant evolution of communications and media (oral, print, electronic etc.,). Ironically, while authors like Jared Diamond have seen human evolution as determined by tangibles like 'Guns, Germs and Steel' YNH talks about 'fictions' yet he acknowledges the power of intangibles (religion, empire and money) to influence history. [Of course tangibles reflect intangibles and vice versa].

In his exposition on the evolution of religion YNH offers interesting perspectives on how animism, polytheism, monotheism and humanism reflect changing ideologies, thus reflecting what Gebserian-Wilberian thought would call 'consciousness structures.' When using the phrase 'spectrum of consciousness' he seems unaware that this was the title of Wilber's first book. Despite overlooking (not citing) these scholars and their parallel historical paradigms, in both books, we may agree with YNH that 'we study history not to know the future, but to widen our horizons, to understand that our present situation is neither natural or inevitable, and that we consequently have many more possibilities before us that we imagine.' In other words, as Gebser suggested, new consciousness structures can emerge at any time, and the future is not easily foreseen!

On science YNH notes the somewhat obvious Renaissance sea change beginning with the modern era some 500 years ago. Premodern rulers gave money to priests and philosopher-scientists to legitimise regime ideals and social order. (What's new)? Today our governments give money to scientists to create 'new' technologies (weapons, medications) and to stimulate the economy. The latter fosters ideals of progress and the bond between science (technology) and empire (social order). Thus, conflicting ideologies arise as to how to best maintain socio-political order: e.g., Marxism v. capitalism, etc., Exploration of new frontiers (empires) gave rise to the likes of Darwin, Wallace and Humboldt. While science admits ignorance in order to explore the unknown, and in predicting the future, it creates its own dogmas, and "can flourish only in alliance with some religion or ideology."

YNH asks why Western Europe became dominant in global production and finance between ~1750 and ~1850. Who would have predicted the 'bizarre' fact that little old GB would open the first commercial railroad and conquer the continent of faraway Australia, lay its rail lines, and also produce Newton, Darwin and Wallace. Was the desire for knowledge linked to the 'mentality of conquest'? Did European empires create most of the world as we know it and the ostensibly democratic, humanist, tolerance ideologies and so create the self-same cultural norms we use to judge them? What of the role of societies and cultures that do not share these values creating the so-called east-west 'clash of civilisations.' YNH also shines light on the differences between premodern zero-sum, slow growth and modern rapid growth and capital reinvestment economies. His megatrends in the evolution of economies?

YNH touches on the theme of abundance, though not in so many words, when noting that the sun produces more energy, (3,766,800 exajoules) a day, than stored in all our fossil fuels. Thus, the industrial revolution, which YNH calls a second agricultural revolution (food for all) has produced an 'Ocean of Energy' to fuel 'The Wheels of Industry' and ultimately 'The Age of Shopping.' These snappy headings are symptomatic of 'Modern Times' (Chaplin's film) – the 'Permanent Revolution' launched in the technological 20th century, from which there appears no turning back. Many, he says, call this 'the destruction of nature', but YNH calls this 'change' and reminds us that extinctions are followed by new evolutionary radiations. He holds that "rumours of our own extinction are premature" but notes there has been a modern 'Collapse of the Family and Community' leading to the strengthening of the individual, the state and the market.

He also comments on want he calls 'Perpetuum Mobile' noting the rapid pace of change manifest in an Internet, unknown 20 years ago, which we already take for granted. We also take for granted that global society will respond humanely to natural disasters. More people died from car accidents in 2000 than in all global wars and crimes. The murder rate is 1/40th of what it was in medieval Europe, and even allowing for failed states statistics the global rate is ¼ of what it used to be. All this has taken place in the Modern era while European empires have collapsed. Does this mean we can now all live happily ever after as YNH's penultimate chapter intimates?

Certainly happiness and well-being (natural and chemical) have become fashionable goals in the west and beyond. Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman is cited for his work in finding that happiness is not 'the surplus of pleasant over unpleasant moments' but rather comes from 'seeing one's life in its entirety as meaningful.' YNH explores the 'know thyself' question, touching on Buddhism's tenet that suffering arises from the desire for elusive and fleeting feelings of happiness. If the desire for happiness is related to capturing such inner feelings it is, he suggests, very non-Buddhist, and we have a long way to go to understand how to achieve happiness and meaning, and to 'know ourselves.' We may know what we can do better than what we want to do, or to paraphrase Einstein, we can't know ourselves and our motivations with our current mindsets. [Maybe uncertainty is inevitable in life as experience so often proves]. Ironically, while biologists scorn intelligent design advocates, they are on a fast track to replacing natural selection with intelligent design, and thus to playing God in the laboratory. YNH ends by asking will we be accountable, because there is nothing "more dangerous than dissatisfied and irresponsible gods who don't know what they want?'