Why Things Matter

This is an interdisciplinary look at the place of values in science, psychoanalysis and religion. We often read that science can be value-free, but this is a cultural illusion. Rather than use the vocabulary of consciousness, the author prefers the term subjectivity, a term which has also been excluded from scientific discourse. The existence of subjects implies uniqueness and cannot be contained within physics. A key chapter differentiates empathy from sympathy and makes sympathy the ultimate basis for perception of moral value since it enables us to recognise others as subjects of experience. The goal of religion is defined as the achievement of a true view of the universe and our relationship to it. This implies a psychoanalytic 'position' or disposition towards the world, the self and other people. This leads the author to question the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, remarking that both subjective and objective accounts are necessary. After a detour into Freud's death drive, Black outlines what he calls the contemplative position which is not transcendent in the traditional sense because we cannot escape from what Varela called the intrinsic secularity in cognitive science. All this leads to a final chapter on the basis of responsible commitment, a commitment that lies beyond rationality in being intentionally circular, as Michael Polanyi pointed out: 'any enquiry into our ultimate beliefs and be consistent only if it presupposes its own conclusions.' An uncomfortable observation, but nevertheless true. The book provides a corrective to the underestimation of subjectivity and feeling in a purely scientific analysis.