ALAS POOR DARWIN: ARGUMENTS AGAINST EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

Alas, poor Darwin, a collection of 15 essays edited by Hilary and Steven Rose could well be titled Alas, poor Richard Dawkins, Alas, poor Edward Wilson, Alas, poor Daniel Dennett. The list goes on, lamenting the errors of Steven Pinker, Robert Wright and other Evolutionary Psychology (EP) pundits whose "new fundamentalist Darwinism looks to claim its place among the other contemporary religious certainties of fundamentalist Islam, Christianity and Judaism,"(p. 125). Harsh words, but perhaps deserved. Given the challenges faced by evolutionary biology in trying to convince a sceptical and intelligent public that genetic determinism and natural selection explain all biological evolution, a great leap of faith is required to extend these doctrines to the complex evolution of mind. Yet, influential figures, like Wilson and Dawkins, tout biology, genes and memes as "the" scientific understanding of human nature. This reductionist claim implies that social science and philosophy are not really up to the task. Moral issues really have biological/animal roots (bottom up approach). Thus "higher" domains of human ethical and spiritual endeavour are not really understandable through cultural and philosophical investigation: i.e. from the top down. Such sweeping dismissals of the valuable contributions made by the social sciences and humanities deserve to be challenged, which is exactly what this book does - most effectively.

I broadly divide the book into two parts. Chapters 2-6 by Dorothy Nelkin, Charles Jencks, Gabriel Dover, Mary Midgley and Stephen J. Gould focus mainly on challenges to Edward Wilson, Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett for their near-evangelical, ultra-Darwinistic sociobiology, gene-meme worship etc. Jencks is flippant, but amusing, about meeting and deconstructing the new "Mr. Darwin" (Wilson) and his preoccupation with such odd concepts as the "Ideal Beautiful Woman" (IBW). Is the ideal man an IBM I wonder!? Dover is tough and technical in denouncing "Dawkins vulgar misappropriation of the theory of natural selection as embodied in the selfish gene delusion." (p. 47), Midgley, as ever, is philosophically insightful about the naïveté and contradictions of EP and its ultimate recourse to ludicrous "occult causes" such as Dennett's "meme for faith" pitted against a "meme for critical judgment." (Does the meme for free will then become the referee?) Gould repeats an apt Darwin opinion, also cited by Midgley, that evolution does not proceed "exclusively" by natural selection. Gould then blasts Dennett for challenging his own work, but is careful to respect his Harvard colleague (Wilson). For me this proves the reality of both competition and cooperation.

Hilary Rose's masterful chapter (7) on Colonising the Social Sciences sets the stage for criticisms (8-15) by nine other authors from cultural theory, psychology, ethology, medical science, sociology, anthropology and feminism. Rose's chapter emphasises the historical, social (not biological) contexts of Darwinism. So, though tough on the likable old gent for racialism, she concedes his views as inevitably "part and parcel of his times." His "innovation lies in transferring a social theory into biological discourse" (p.109). Biologists don't like to hear this distinctly top down interpretation, which implies that human nature has its "roots" in ongoing socio-cultural dynamics , not in the rigid psychological conditioning of our ice age ancestors. Thus, 'tis refreshing that Ted Benton (chapter 13) reminds us that Alfred Russell Wallace promulgated enlightened evolutionary views different from Darwin's. Vive la difference!

I was surprised to learn just how speculative most Evolutionary Psychology is, and will find this book useful in suggesting which authors to avoid. (I already "select" against the silly ideas of certain famous pundits)! The EP field is rife with speculation, contradiction and poorly-informed gargling, rather than drinking, at the fountain of knowledge. Ironically, simplistic notions that human nature is biologically programmed (by ice age natural selection pressure) derive from contemporary, information society, computer metaphors.

Though I recommend the book unreservedly, especially to biologists willing to learn from the social sciences, and rethink the "biology- as -destiny" manifesto, I would have enjoyed a summary chapter in the vein of Laszlo's Grand Evolutionary Synthesis, or Wilber's great nest of being scheme (thus getting us beyond repeated critiques of individuals and their work). Such synthetic perennial philosophy perspectives appreciate that the "rules" and "laws" of nature are hierarchical (or differentiated) as we proceed from the material, to the biological, psychological and spiritual realms, becoming more complex, subtle and flexible along the way. Alas, poor Darwin also makes it clear that such laws are complex and do not transfer from the bottom up or top down without significant adjustment. Tim Ingold's thoughtful exposition of ecological psychology shows how we evolve skills in context, as an ongoing process of "embodiment and enmindment," not, as the EP crowd would have it, through the mechanical playing out of hard-wired programs. EP alas, is stuck in a paradigm of mind-body duality. As Stephen Rose concludes, human nature is flexible and pluralistic. We can "select" programs other than Evolutionary Psychology which, alas, reveals a lack of evolutionary and psychological substance.

Laszlo, E. 1987. Evolution: the grand synthesis. Shambala, 211p.