Half Gone

Last year I attended a conference on Peak Oil in Edinburgh, where Jeremy Leggett was one of the speakers, along with other analysts mentioned in his book such as Matthew Simmons, Chris Skrebowski and Colin Campbell. I subsequently wrote a briefing on the proceedings for Omnipedia (see www.internationalfuturesforum.com) and have reviewed Simmons' book Twilight in the Desert, which analyses differences between official and unofficial estimates of Saudi oil reserves. Since that time, the issue of peak oil has emerged into the public consciousness, but most people remain fairly complacent, even in the face of high prices. Jeremy Leggett's career uniquely qualifies him to undertake the task that he sets himself in this book. Starting as an oil geologist, he became an oil consultant then chief scientist of Greenpeace, and is now the chief executive of Britain's largest solar energy company. As such, his knowledge and experience ranges over geology, economics, science and politics.

The book begins and ends with an allegorical tale about the Blue Pearl and its inhabitants called Thinkers. This form enables the author to establish a certain ironic distance from human history and to highlight our oversights when faced with an unprecedented situation. Otherwise, the book is divided into two parts: oil depletion, and oil depletion meets global warming. It is this second part which makes the book unique. In the first part Leggett runs through the arguments for an insufficiency of supply in the face of continuously escalating demand - there is no way that we can expect to produce 120 million barrels a day in 20 years time; even if we could, the greenhouse results would be catastrophic without the introduction of a huge carbon sequestration programme. He carefully presents the evidence and figures put forward for peak oil, distinguishing between what he calls early and late toppers. Everyone agrees that oil supply will eventually peak. Early toppers think that this is imminent while later toppers argue that this point will not arrive until the 2030s. I myself take the early topper view as I do not consider official reserve estimates at all accurate or reliable. The figures were increased by all Middle East producers in an attempt to increase their quota, without any proper basis for the alleged new reserves. In this connection, it is interesting to note that discoveries actually peaked in the 1960s. The last year in which we discovered more oil than we consumed was over 25 years ago. Leggett concludes that even if the popping point does not arrive soon, the results of two decades of negligence in infrastructure investment and exploration will precipitate a crisis within two or three years.

If readers are not already concerned, they will certainly become so on reading the analysis in Part Two. It is clear that the insurance industry has been worried for some time. Although they have an annual income in excess of $2 trillion (10% of the global economy) losses from natural catastrophes have been rising at around 10% per annum in constant dollars for 40 years. Leggett summarises the threats implied by global warming in terms of biodiversity loss, sea-level rise, threats to capital markets, water and food supplies, human health, increased risk of conflict and social instability, and the probability of amplifying feedbacks resulting in a possible runaway effect. None of this makes comforting reading but it is all based on reliable scientific scenarios. The main point is that none of the news is good, even in the presence of current uncertainty.

The next chapters explain how we got ourselves into this mess and what we have or have not done about it since the evidence became clearer in the mid-1990s. Leggett uncovers the machinations of the industry-sponsored Global Climate Coalition in using professional sceptics to counter the enormous weight of scientific consensus. The Coalition's position is eventually became so extreme that BP actually with true. Finally, Leggett asks what we can actually do about it, and advances five arguments which he elaborates in detail. He thinks that it will be possible to replace oil, gas and coal completely with a plentiful supply of renewable energy, and faster than most people think. However, the shortfall between current expectation of oil supply and actual availability will be so great that there will be a gap resulting in serious economic trauma. Renewable energy and fuel use will increasingly substitute for oil and gas although there will also be a dash for coal which may tip ecosystems into crisis. The author also thinks that there is a good deal that people can do to increase the production of renewables faster than coal. The details of many of these arguments will be unfamiliar to most readers, but Leggett makes a good case that renewables can plug the gap and that a new generation of nuclear power stations is unnecessary. In the Afterword he relates how he listened to a former US secretary of energy, James Slessinger, liken denial about to peak oil to Pompeii's citizens ignoring the rumblings below Vesuvius. Even if you disagree with Leggett's authoritative arguments, there can be little doubt that a large part of his analysis is likely to come true in the medium-term. No thinking person can afford to remain uninformed about these issues, and this book provides the essential background information.