Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction

Lazily, I mostly review books chosen from preference. Human Nature after Darwin was an exception - an Open University text complete with chapter by chapter summaries, review questions and an appendix with "answers to your questions." If only all answers to questions about human nature were so simple! But freshmen philosophers must start somewhere, and Richards demonstrates an effort to be matter of fact and "objective," despite the immense ambiguities and paradoxes inherent in her subject. I was surprised, after reviewing Alas poor Darwin, (Network 77) to find the mainly materialistic, controversial and "bottom up" views of Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and Robert Wright treated most sympathetically. Richards claims she is not necessarily defending the philosophies of those she chooses to "analyse," yet one cover blurb flatly tells us that the book helps establish that "anti-Darwinians" are plain "wrong." Richards, moreover, is bold in attacking what she perceives as the non-objective views of respected philosophers like Mary Midgley. This raises at least two general concerns: 1) can anyone be purely objective and rational in the analysis/treatment of such a complex subject, and 2) who are the experts on Darwinism, evolution and human nature: biologists, paleontologists, psychologists, sociologists or philosophers? Increasingly it seems to be a free for all. Richards is right to warn of the dangers of spreading Darwinian theories of natural selection "beyond the range of organic evolution" (i.e., to evolutionary psychology), but she is as confusing as her subject matter, in making clear which "rival Darwinian theories" or "different degrees of Darwinism" we are debating, and why. There is a danger in trying to be so objective in analysing the work of others that your own viewpoint is lost. I got an odd sense of her position when she defended Dawkins and Wright by saying that they do not really mean what they say about genetic determinism. What then do they mean? Richards wants us sympathetically to understand the Dawkins gene-machine metaphor. OK, so Goethe said that everything we say is metaphor, but this means Dawkins' opponents are also entitled to their anti-gene machine metaphors. Richards is also much too politically correct and sensitive when complaining that "reductionism" is used as a term of abuse! Does this mean we cannot point out its limitations or excesses? If I were a student I would be very confused by the "arguments" over what was said and not said, or meant, and all the premises, assumptions, conditionals, implications and equivocations which permeate Richards' analyses. I also found the use of hypothetical people and points of view ungainly and unconvincing, if not ridiculous: e.g., "maybe we shall find genetic and pharmacological ways of making changes…[to female possessiveness]… at the present rate of genetic progress…" ( p. 123), or by finding a male fidelity drug (p. 255). My guess is most SMN members would be aghast. Likewise I was not impressed by suggestions (p. 142) that "free will… seems not to exist.." or is dependent on "which degree of Darwinism was true…" or ( p. 146) that "to find out if free will exists…" we need to define it and then see… "if the world is such as to allow it." Surely if one first decides to define free will one has already exercised it!!

I give Richards credit for some of the more philosophical points she makes (Chapter 8) when she gets off the subject of Darwinism (which she divides too rigidly into three or more schools, quoting the old gent himself only once in 300 pages). I found the book difficult and troubling because while Richards mostly frequently implies her position, (that the universe and evolution lack purpose, order or foresight; p. 206, 247, 251) she rarely states or develops it explicitly. For me Richards is too overly analytical intellectual and non-synthetic, leading to too much "deconstruction." Missing is a sympathetic treatment of such components of human nature as experience, intuition, compassion, fear, joy, inconsistency, humor, emotion, etc. After all Darwin wrote a book on The expression of the emotion in man and the animals. Also I think it plain wrong to say that evolution lacks purpose or order. After all evolution is a concept recognized by the human intellect, which has these capacities. We should teach students to think "open mindedly" in terms of causality, simultaneity and teleology (past, present and future) as the subject (matter, biology, psychology) demands. Richards has perhaps challenged the students to think, but in too analytical, unsympathetic and nit-picking a way. Some of the greatest challenges to Darwinism come from thoughtful analysis of the basic tenets of his theory of natural selection (Macbeth, 1971). Here the philosophical issues are treated very simply and eloquently, in ways a student could easily understand. A chapter reviewing such work might serve as a prelude, and warning, to students that the application of "Darwinism" to "human nature" is fraught with problems from the very beginning. This, at least, becomes apparent from Richards' book.

Macbeth, N. 1977. Darwin Retried: an appeal to reason. Gambit, Massachusetts.