PLURALISM AND THE MIND

This impressive book provides a thorough overhaul of consciousness studies in both philosophical and psychological terms. Broadly speaking, it argues that conventional reductive materialism cannot be sustained and makes the case instead for what Matthew calls emergent property pluralism. There are four parts: the first gives a thorough historical context, the second looks at philosophical considerations, the third at physicalism and its limits, and the fourth considers controversies and speculations. Although the first sentence says that the book is about the mind and its place in nature and in particular about the gap between personal experiences of consciousness and images of mind from cognitive sciences, the work of CD Broad (The Mind and its Place in Nature) is not cited and would have been a useful addition to the overall argument. Matthew begins with some examples, which leads the reader immediately into broad theoretical considerations, including the pervasive influence of scientism or what Sir Karl Popper called promissory materialism.

Matthew is right to say that consciousness is a function of worldview, and in particular of monism rather than pluralism, as one sees in the work of Christof Koch. This enables him to introduce his basic proposition that no single theory will prove definitive and that a plurality of approaches will remain necessary. The historical section refers to many key thinkers in the history of Western philosophy and especially to the pivotal influence of Descartes in formulating a mechanistic outlook on life, which many people forget is itself a metaphor. Then there are references to Mesmer, vitalism, TH Huxley and Darwin before moving on to psychology in the late 19th century William James and Frederic Myers - in this section mention could also have been made of the contribution of Alfred Russel Wallace, whose logical demolition of Hume's Essay on Miracles is quite masterly. The legacy of behaviourism and the cognitive revolution come next so that the reader has a good grasp of the salient points informing the modern scientific worldview.

The philosophical section deals with ontology, epistemology and the problem of biological causation. It is good to see this treatment, and I agree with the author that the mind-brain issue is primarily metaphysical rather than empirical. He provides an excellent chart of different ontologies with their corresponding ideas on substance and the social principle. The main theories are treated in turn, including eliminative materialism, panpsychism, epiphenomenalism and identity theory as well as dualistic ontologies. In the chapter on epistemology, there is a good discussion of surface versus depth perspectives, which raises the question that most human capacities are not expressed in reducible structured ways that many models suggest. In fact, we have no reason to suppose that scientific models are exhaustive.

The third part begins with an analysis of the computational model of mind, considering the work of Igor Aleksander and the assumption by thinkers such as Steven Pinker who equates information-processing with thought. These models do not satisfactorily address the binding problem or the nature of autonomy. Readers will be aware that mainstream cognitive science believes that consciousness will eventually be understood in physical terms using some form of causal mechanical model as a boundary condition. The presupposition is that neural mechanisms underlie all subjective experiences, an assumption questioned by accounts of veridical near death experiences. Matthew identifies a number of limitations of conventional models, including problem of qualia, the passivity of consciousness, the focus on waking states and the total disregard or dismissal of parapsychological phenomena. He considers the relevance of quantum theories of consciousness, especially the work of Henry Stapp. The next chapter looks at the limits of neuroimaging and its underlying assumptions that the brain is modular, that mental functions can be localised, and that the mind is a neural code. These assumptions shape the output.

The fourth part begins by summarising the overall argument, asserting that a theory of consciousness needs to be a theory of subjects and should not be downgraded in favour of functional data and approaches. Various objections to subjective experiences are discussed and refuted and the author also considers relational approaches, including the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. In the next chapter, he considers the thorny issue of teleology and various interpretations of Darwinism. This leads on to a consideration of the panexperientialism of Whitehead and evolutionary emergence. A good chapter on free will follows, where the author has some sympathy for an expanded version of compatibilism while concluding that current science and physicalism cannot handle the problem of mental and conscious causation. Myers' theory of personality is discussed in the next chapter along with the philosophical implications of deep self theories. One of the most interesting chapters probes the limits of the possible and one comes up against the author's own boundary of questioning evidence for some form of survival of death owing to his general view that mind and consciousness are primarily biological phenomena.

After giving some background to the field, he discusses three case studies relating to stigmata, past life memories of children and Ganzfeld experiments, examining the debates on the issues raised. This is part of a wider controversy over the status of psi, which has been going on for over 100 years. This also raises the question of survival versus super ESP, and his discussion of survival is not informed by the same level of knowledge of evidence as other parts of the book. He states that he has not seen anything that would make him think that any part of us survived beyond death and fails to mention, for instance, the work of the late David Fontana in this field. There is in fact a mountain of evidence for those who wish to consider it.

The concluding chapter asks if we could construct a one size fits all theory of consciousness and if we could, should we do so to the exclusion of other theories. The title of the book gives the answer to question, and the author observes that the mindless and meaningless universe exists only within the models of science. Each view has its own limitations that can be complemented by a plurality of approaches. He rightly states that many conceptual worlds remain possible within the constraining matrix of experience without being constrained further by physicalist assumptions. As I suggested at the beginning, this book provides a thorough overhaul of contemporary issues in the philosophy and psychology of consciousness studies and deserves a wide readership. It contributes to the reflective process and reformulation of the metaphysical assumptions underlying current conventional approaches to consciousness. One can only hope that some of the thinkers criticised in this book will read it.