THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT – OMISSIONS AND DISTORTIONS

This is the sequel to David Griffin's earlier book The New Pearl Harbor, which I reviewed in last summer's issue. The conclusion of the first, carefully argued book was that the reader had to choose between two theories: the complicity theory, whereby the US government was to a degree complicit in the events surrounding 9/11; and the coincidence/incompetence theory where a series of seemingly connected events were in fact unconnected and the whole episode came about through massive and systemic incompetence. At the heart of the debate about explanations for 9/11 lies the question of whether the right dots have been connected in order to produce the correct explanation. The intelligence services claim that they connected the wrong dots (this also applies to the issue of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction) where others, more cynical, claim that they knew which dots to connect but did not do so.

At the end of The New Pearl Harbor, Griffin calls for a truly independent commission to investigate the events surrounding 9/11. The US government's answer is the 9/11 Commission, whose report even rose into the best-seller lists when it came out last year, before the election. Here Griffin probes their analysis and finds it wanting in almost every respect, hence the subtitle 'Omissions and Distortions'. It is worth reminding the reader that Griffin is not an axe-grinding pundit but a well respected professor of religion and theology and author of 25 books; as such, his technique is to subject claims to critical scrutiny in the light of the available evidence. In discussions with friends about 9/11 since last summer, many are sceptical of the kind of claims made by critics of the 'official version', mainly, I believe, because they have not read the detailed analysis for themselves. They are sceptical of any claim involving complicity (i.e. conspiracy theory) while those who have read the evidence and analysis tend to be cynical towards the official version and they question the integrity and motives of those in charge. So, oddly enough, cynics and sceptics find themselves at loggerheads.

Griffin points out in his introduction that the two competing theories about 9/11 are both 'conspiracy theories': the official view claims that the attacks were planned and executed solely by Al-Qaeda terrorists, while the alternative view claims that the attacks of 9/11 were able to succeed only because they were facilitated by the Bush administration and its agencies. Griffin is in no doubt about the importance of the 9/11 Commission report, which claims to provide 'the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11.' He proposes that there are three reasons for a careful examination of the report to see whether its conclusions are justified by the available evidence: 'first, whether the Bush administration's "war on terror" was an appropriate response to 9/11; second, whether the report of the 9/11 Commission should be accepted as the definitive account; and, third, whether the success of the attacks would have been less likely if the recommended structural changes had already been in place.' A fourth reason is the possibility of a cover-up, which many US citizens suspect may have taken place.

A number of other preliminary questions arise: was the Commission 'non-partisan', 'independent', 'impartial' and 'thorough' as the chairs insist? The answer to all these questions seems to be no. The Commission's co-ordinator, Philip D. Zelikow, and its chairman, Thomas H. Kean, who oversaw both the investigations and the writing of the final report, are both Republicans. Griffin's initial claim that the Commission 'presupposed the truth of the official theory from the outset' is well backed up by his subsequent analysis, as is his assertion that the Commission's report for the most part 'simply ignores all the "events surrounding 9/11" that have been cited as evidence for the alternative conspiracy theory.' Omissions are also apparent, as is evident in an open letter to the US Congress signed by 25 individuals 'who have worked within various government agencies (FBI, CIA, FAA, DIA, Customs) responsible for national security and public safety.' These individuals themselves testified to the Commission but their concerns were not included in the report. They conclude: 'The omission of such serious and applicable issues and information by itself renders the report flawed, and casts doubt on the validity of many of its recommendations.' Griffin observes that the report does not in fact provide the 'fullest possible account' of the facts and circumstances surrounding 9/11 but instead 'provides a fairly full account of those facts and circumstances that are consistent with the official conspiracy theory about 9/11. Every fact inconsistent with this theory is either distorted or entirely omitted.'

If the reader thinks this an extravagant claim, it is more than adequately backed up in the analysis of the chapters that follow. The first part exposes the Commission's omissions and distortions, while the second shows how the Commission defended the US Military and placed an unfair amount of blame on the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA). Those familiar with the issues of the first part will recognise the crucial questions: the identity of the hijackers, the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings, the strike on the Pentagon, the behaviour of Bush and his secret service, advance information about the attacks, connections between the administration and the bin Ladens, the Saudi flights, allegations about the FBI headquarters, the role of Pakistan and the ISI (secret service), and possible motives of the Bush administration – the background of foreign policy and the fact that attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq were in the pipeline even before 9/11. Hence 9/11 provided the pretext rather than the cause of the attacks.

Part Two contains a detailed account of the Commission's report about the four hijacked flights, showing how stories and timelines were adjusted and contrasting earlier and later official versions that reveal basic inconsistencies and even contradictions. All this seems to have been designed to make the 'FAA look as if it failed to follow its standard procedures on 9/11 in order to disguise the fact that the US military did not in fact follow its own standard procedures.' So the FAA and the intelligence services take the hit.

Griffin's conclusion recaps his earlier analysis, arguing that the Commission's omissions and distortions mean that the final report cannot be trusted. In addition, various conflicts of interest with the agencies being investigated emerge. Griffin ends by saying that the 9/11 Commission report only serves to confirm his earlier suspicions about official complicity in the attacks. I agree. And if readers find this incredible, then I can only urge them to read Griffin's two books for themselves, bearing in mind that official news rarely reveals the extent of covert operations that may be entirely at odds with official policies and explanations, and which serve to further the interests and power of those individuals and nations who promote them. In a world of Realpolitik, power is the central motivation and the ends are said to justify any kind of means.