Causation in Science

The emphasis of this technical book is on causal constraints in science, i.e. general conceptual scaffolding and principles rather than causal relations between individual elements or events. It goes beyond the linguistic turn that challenges the notion of truth itself to discuss specific causal constraints, specifically determinism, locality, stability, symmetries, conservation laws and variation principles. Individual chapters discuss in more detail relationships between some of these terms, for instance determinism and stability, determinism and locality and symmetries and conservation laws. The first chapter looks at various approaches to causation in relation to understanding change in terms not only of what happens, but what does not happen or is theoretically excluded from happening. It becomes evident that terms are sometimes conflated, for example chance and contingency, determinism and stability - this is discussed with respect to physics. In looking at the scientific transition from teleology to causality, the author distinguishes actions that are goal-directed and analyses the philosophical problems of attributing causality in view of a universe that is causally closed – the basis of much discussion about free will. She rejects the reductionism of Jaegwon Kim, but her approach to free will is based more on lawlessness compatible with lower-level determinism. I find this kind of philosophical discussion somewhat linear and one-dimensional, as I think that complexity has transcended this level and, in addition, no account is taken of the role of the unconscious and social constraints.