Knowledge Lost

In 2019, I reviewed The Secular Enlightenment by Margaret Jacob on the relationship between the Enlightenment and secularism, where its emergence was accompanied by widespread resistance and censorship. This fascinating book paints a similar picture of the early Enlightenment but from a very different vantage point, namely that of what the author calls ‘precarious knowledge’ belonging to the ‘intellectual precariat’. The accepted narrative of advancement, refinement and expansion of knowledge is replaced by suppression, censorship and marginalisation. This new intellectual history features forgotten and neglected figures from the ‘knowledge underclass’ – illustrated with case histories on Biblical interpretation, numismatics and magic. It recognises the vulnerability and loss of knowledge and the risks involved in disseminating atheism and heresy. The authorities were especially wary of the atheist and the libertine, sometimes associated with the same person.

One starting point is the burning of Michael Servetus in 1553 in Geneva, when all available copies of his work were burnt as well – the person and his books are both vehicles of transmission. Both the carrier and his knowledge are threatened, and enjoy correspondingly risky and low status. Among tactics for expressing their heterodox views, some more controversial statements were relegated to footnotes or expressed by a partner in dialogue where it is more difficult to pin a particular view on the author (Galileo employed the same tactic). What the author called the intellectual bourgeoisie form a ‘knowledge securiat’, secure in the acceptance of their mainstream ideas. Not surprisingly, censorship and persecution made secrecy crucial and promoted clandestine means of distribution. People used pseudonyms and publishers posted false information – this applied to Voltaire, who often issued a denial of authorship on publication of a new work. The author points out how cultures of knowledge are structured by trust or distrust – which is also related to the issue of authority.

An interesting concept is that of ‘inferential explosiveness’ as an indicator of the precarious state of the claim advanced if it has upsetting implications for an established body of knowledge controlled by authorities. In the case of Servetus, his argument that the New Testament has no references to the Trinity could undermine belief in the divinity of Christ. Dangerous themes included ‘extremist political critiques, critiques of religion, contempt for what was generally regarded as moral or decent.’ In some cases, this resulted in people like Herman Samuel Reimarus leading a double life as a respected University professor and secret author of the most radical biblical criticism of the time. In other cases, the public persona is far removed from the private individual. Emblematically, this can be represented by a mask – there are several illustrations of this – which reveals even as it conceals. In 1729, Johann Heinrich Heubel compiled his own list of 67 authors who had been burned at the stake and over 160 titles of burned books – a reminder of the grave dangers of dissent.

Hence the need for epistemic courage and the importance of the Enlightenment motto sapere aude. One interesting figure is Erhard Weigel, one of Leibniz’s teachers at the University of Jena. He was an interdisciplinary Renaissance figure who kept rather quiet about his interests in pansophic and Kabbalistic ideas, although these are evident in a detailed chart where mathematicians are characterised as rationalists and natural scientists as mechanists with respect to approaches to proof; the former employ deduction while the latter practise induction. (p. 254) He was bold enough to combine a hermetic Neo-Platonism with Aristotelian scholastic philosophy – by 1650, ‘occult philosophy was not tolerated at a Lutheran University’, which is still broadly true today except in specialist niches.

The relevance and status of such precarious knowledge have recently assumed a new importance with the development of an orthodoxy of consensus science that marginalises, suppresses and censors those who express alternative viewpoints, endangering the integrity of scientific debate and fomenting a culture of intolerance that is fundamentally antithetical to Enlightenment ideals. Even if epistemically courageous heretics can no longer be burned at the stake, they are nonetheless persecuted while their more cautious and pragmatic colleagues dare not put their heads above the parapet in this climate of intimidation, even if they agree with their colleagues privately. In many cases, they understandably cannot afford to lose their livelihoods. Freedom is traded for security in an increasingly authoritarian and intolerant atmosphere that prizes conformity over openness and diversity of opinion.